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Abstract
This paper surveys the link between imperfect competition and the e¤ects
of scal policy on output, employment and welfare. We examine static and
dynamic models, with and without entry under a variety of assumptions using
a common analytical framework. We nd that in general there is a robust re-
lationship between the scal multiplier and welfare, the tantalizing possibility
of Pareto improving scal policy is much more elusive. In general, the mecha-
nisms are supply side, and so welfare improving policy, whilst possible, is not
a general result.
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1 Introduction
In a perfectly competitive economy (sometimes referred to as "Walrasian") without
market imperfections, any competitive equilibrium will be Pareto optimal. Hence
there can be no e¢ ciency motive for macroeconomic policy, whether scal or mon-
etary. However, the presence of imperfect competition in the form of market power
leads to an equilibrium which will in general not be Pareto optimal, with a level of
output and employment below competitive equilibrium. This leads to the tantalizing
possibility that scal policy can be used to shift the economy to a new equilibrium
which will Pareto dominate the initial equilibrium. In this paper we survey and ex-
plain the literature on imperfect competition and macroeconomics in the context of
scal policy in a "real" model without money. This was one of the key pillars of New
Keynesian macroeconomics in the 1980s and 1990s, alongside the nominal models
with price and wage stickiness1.
The main contribution of New Keynesian economics was to set imperfect competi-
tion at the heart of Keynesian economics and its current incarnation as the "New Key-
nesian/Neoclassical Synthesis". This marked a major departure from the approach of
Keynes himself, especially Keynes (1936), who used a perfectly competitive market
structure to give microfoundations to the supply side of the economy. Perhaps the
two main reasons were (i) that the theory of imperfect competition was relatively
underdeveloped at that time, (ii) Keynes conviction that he was generalizing the
existing theory with perfect competition and market clearing being a special case
(hence the title of his work). Still in the 1930s, imperfect competition and macro-
economics would be mixed in Kalecki (1938) and in the Dunlop (1938) critique to
the real-wage counter-cyclicity implicit in the General Theory. However, despite this
promising start, four decades would pass before we can nd a signicant piece of
work in the mainstream using imperfectly competitive microfoundations in macro-
economics. During the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s some of the concepts
and techniques that would allow the integration of imperfect competition in general-
equilibrium models were developed, in particular Negishi (1961). In the second half
of the 1970s we nd the rst attempts to integrate these concepts in macroeconomic
models. Nonetheless, their success was limited due to the "subjective-demand-curve"
assumption.2
Oliver harts model, Hart (1982), was the rst to operationalise the concept of
1See Dixon (2008) which sets this strand of literature in the context of the wider New Keynesian
approach.
2A subjective demand curve is simply one that is "perceived" by the rm. It can be subject to
constraint that it passes through the actual price-quantity pair that occurs in equilibrium. However,
this led to endemic multiplicity of equilibria. For a short survey of the literature see Dixon and
Rankin (1995).
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the "objectivedemand curve" in a general-equilibrium model with imperfect com-
petition (Cournot oligopoly for each good and monopoly unions), producing some
"Keynesian" outcomes, namely equilibrium with under-employment (though not in-
voluntary unemployment) and a multiplier mechanism for autonomous demand (a
non-produced good in this case) that resembles the traditional Keynesian multiplier.
Oliver Harts work gives rise to a new generation of New Keynesian models3 char-
acterised by the use of imperfect competition in general equilibrium macroeconomic
models. A few notable examples are Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Bénassy (1987),
Blanchard and Kyiotaki (1987), Hall (1986), Mankiw (1985), Snower (1983), and
Weitzman (1982). These and other papers were analysed in surveys of the literature
written at the time Dixon and Rankin (1994) or Silvestre (1993).
Despite the fact that we can nd references to scal policy e¤ectiveness under
imperfect competition in all the above-mentioned papers, the systematic treatment
of the problem, isolated from further considerations, assumptions, and results related
to the general equilibrium, can only be found in the second half of the 1980s.
In this survey, we analyse the e¤ectiveness of scal policy in general-equilibrium
models with the following features:
1. agents are fully rational;
2. there is no uncertainty;
3. the economy is closed;
4. there is imperfect competition in goods markets;
5. labour markets are perfectly competitive;
6. prices of goods and factors are perfectly exible;
7. public consumption has no direct e¤ects on utilities and technologies of pri-
vate agents, and we assume a benevolent government, so we can abstract from
political-economy issues;
8. there is no agent heterogeneity.
These assumptions allow us to study the e¤ect of imperfect competition in goods
markets on scal policy, isolating it from other factors. Therefore, we can present a
set of theoretical models using the same framework in order to study the e¤ects of
3The rst generation refers to contributitions such as Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979), especially
interested in price- and wage-setting rules for relativelly long periods (short-run ad hoc nominal
rigidity).
2
changing a particular basic assumption. We will concentrate on the e¤ects of scal
policy in two main objectives: aggregate output and representative-household welfare.
The choice for these two objectives, especially the rst one, is the usual one in the
literature, but it is justied by the assumptions considered, as we will see throughout
the survey. Section 2 is dedicated to simple static models and section 3 covers the
dynamic models. Section 3 concludes.
2 Static models
In this section we develop a class of static general equilibrium models that nests most
of the relevant literature on the topic4.
2.1 The microeconomic foundations
2.1.1 Households
Let us assume there is a large number of identical households that maximise a utility
function depending on the consumption of a basket of goods (C) and leisure (Z):
max
C;Z
U = u (C;Z) . (1)
This is a continuous twice-di¤erentiable function with the following features5:
uC > 0, uZ > 0, uCC < 0, uZZ > 0, and uCZ = uZC > 0. The above-mentioned basket













where c (j), with j 2 [0; n], represents the consumption of variety j,  > 1 stands
for the (absolute value of the) elasticity of substitution between goods, n is the mass
of the continuum of varieties, and  2 [0; 1] controls the consumerslevel of love for
variety: if  = 0, then there is no love for variety, when  = 1 we have the Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) extreme case of love for variety, and for  2 (0; 1) there is some love
for variety and it is larger (smaller) the closer this parameter is from one (zero).
Leisure is dened as the complement to one (by normalisation) of the time spent
working (L):
4This model is based on the Aggregation Lecture by Luís Costa "Macroeconomics" used also for
PhD courses given at York 2005 and ISEG/TULisbon.
5For sake of simplicity we use the following notation for partial derivatives:
fx =
@f
@x (x; y) fxy =
@2f
@x@y (x; y) .
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Z = 1  L. (3)




c (j) :p (j) :dj, (4)
where w represents the nominal wage,  is the non-wage income (prots), T stands
for the direct-tax levied on this household, and p (j), with j 2 [0; n], is the price of
good j. Households know direct taxes are a linear function of their primary income:
T = T0 + t: (w:L+) , (5)
where t 2 [0; 1) and T0 < (1  t) : (w:L+).6
Considering C is a CES function, we have homothetic preferences over varieties.
Thus, the representative household problem given by equations (1) to (5) can be
solved in two steps:
1) minimising total expenditure, given the optimal choice for the quantity of
private-consumption baskets (C)7;
2) maximising utility, given the optimal expenditure function.























and the optimal (minimal) expenditure function is given by P:C.
Notice the demand for good j is decreasing, and with a constant price elasticity
given by (in absolute value) , on the relative price of this good compared to the
average (p (j) =P ), it is increasing on aggregate consumption intentions (C), and it is
not increasing on the mass of available goods (n), with an elasticity given by 1  .
From the second step we obtain
6Notice that it is possible to have a progressive scal system in this formulation, as long as t > 0
and T0 < 0.
7This problem could be solved with a general sub-utility function C = C (n; [c (j)]n0 ), as long as
it still represents homothetic preferences over goods. However, for sake of simplicity we will keep
CES preferences here, as they clearly dominate the literature.
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C = C (!N ; N) , (8)
L = L (!N ; N) , (9)
where !N  w: (1  t) =P represents the real net wage, N  [: (1  t)  T0] =P 
: (1  t)    0 stands for the net real non-wage income, equation (8) is the private
consumption function where C!N > 0 and CN > 0, and equation (9) represents the
labour-supply function where L!N R 0 and LN < 0.8
As one could expect, private consumption intentions are an increasing function of
the real net wage (C!N > 0) and also of the real non-wage income (CN > 0), both
taken as given by households. The net real non-wage income has a negative impact
on labour supply (LN < 0), but the e¤ect of the real net wage (L!N ) cannot be
determined ex ante, as it depends on both the substitution e¤ect (> 0) and on the
income e¤ect (< 0).
2.1.2 Government
Firstly, let us assume government controls the real value of its public expenditure
(G) and uses it as an economic-policy decision variable. In order to avoid com-
plicating the model due to composition e¤ects of public expenditure, we assume
the government-consumption basket has exactly the same CES composition then the
private-consumption basket given by (2).
Thus, in order to minimise total expenditure in all goods for a given level of G,
the demand function of each variety for public consumption, g (j) with j 2 [0; n], is
given by an equation identical to (6). The relevant price index is still given by P and
public consumption expenditure is P:G.
The government budget constraint is given by
P:G+ w:	 = T0 + t: (w:L+) , (10)
where	  0 represents the quantity of unproductive labour hired by the government9,
using the same labour market than rms. This is only a device used by Mankiw (1988)
to simulate public-debt nancing of government expenditure in a static model10.
Therefore, this equation nests several cases, corresponding to several types of
nancing:
8See appendix 1.
9We call it "unproductive labour" as it does not yield non-market services, contrary to what
happens in real economies.
10Assuming, of course, households exhibit a non-Ricardian behaviour.
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I. The case when government intends to keep the simultaneous control of the
(net) autonomous tax (T0 6= 0), the marginal tax rate, and also of public consump-
tion. In this case, non-productive employment becomes the endogenous variable that
adjusts to the economic situation:
	 =
T0 + t: (w:L+)  P:G
w
; (10.I)
II. The case when government decides not to hire unproductive labour (	 = 0)
and it intends to keep the control over the marginal tax rate (t > 0). In this case,
the (net) autonomous tax becomes the endogenous variable:
T0 = P:G  t: (w:L+) ; (10.II)
III. The case when government decides not to levy a (net) autonomous tax
(T0 = 0), besides the fact it does not hire unproductive labour (	 = 0). Thus, the





For sake of simplicity, we will concentrate on the study of the e¤ects of changing
public consumption on the economy equilibria, ignoring the e¤ects of changing other
scal variables as unproductive labour (	), (net) autonomous taxes (T0), and the
marginal tax rate (t), when these variables are exogenous.
2.1.3 Industries
The productive sector is composed by a continuum of industries with mass n > 0 and
each industry is dedicated to producing a di¤erentiated good. Thus, we will identify
the industry that produces good j (= (j)) as the set of rms that produce it. We
assume m (j)  1 rms exist in this industry, so industry j is composed by rms i (j)
such that:
= (j) = fi (j) : i (j) = 1; :::;m (j)g ; j 2 [0; n] .
Market demand directed to industry j (d (j)) is given by the sum of private and
government demands, i.e.









where D  C +G represents aggregate demand, i.e. total demand for CES baskets.
6







where yi(j) represents the output (of good j 2 [0; n]) of rm i (j) 2 = (j).
2.1.4 Firms
Let us now assume a rm i (j), belonging to the industry of good j, has the following
strategic behaviour11:
 it competes with other rms in its industry (k (j) 6= i (j) 2 = (j)) using quan-
tities produced as a strategic variable - intra-industrial Cournot competition;
 it competes with rms in other industries (s 6= j 2 [0; n]) using posted prices as
a strategic variable - inter-industrial Bertrand competition.
We call Cournotian Monopolistic Competition12 (CMC) to this type of market
structure and it allows us to nest the following as particular cases:
1. perfect competition when the number of rms in industry j 2 [0; n] is very large
(m (j)!1) or if varieties are close substitutes ( !1);
2. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition when all industries have a
single producer (m (j) = 1, j 2 [0; n]);
3. Cournot oligopolies in each industry when the number of rms within them
(m (j) > 1) is small.
Let us analyse the prot maximisation program for rm i (j) (i(j)), one of the
producers of good j:
max
yi(j)
i(j) = p (j) :yi(j)   TCi(j), (13)
11Had we not considered a continumm of goods, but a nite number of varieties instead, an indi-
vidual producer could be su¢ ciently large to consider the e¤ects of its own actions on macroeconomic
variables. In this case, we would observe a feedback e¤ect from the macro into the microeconomic
level. For a few examples of models that consider the possibility of large rms at the economy level
see Costa (2001), DAspremont et al. (1989), or Wu and Zhang (2000), amongst other.
12See DAspremont et al. (1997).
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where TCi(j) represents total cost for this rm.
In order to keep the model simple, we assume the production technology of this
good by this rm uses a single input, labour, and it is represented by
yi(j) =
(
Ai(j):Ni(j)    (= Ni(j) > Ai(j) ;
0 (= 0  Ni(j)  Ai(j) ;
(14)
where Ni(j) represents the labour quantity hired by rm i (j), Ai(j) > 0 stands for the
(constant) marginal productivity of labour, and   0 is a technological parameter
that can be interpreted in the following way: there is a minimum quantity of labour
(=Ai(j)) necessary for rms to work, but it does not represent production capacity
in terms of good j. We can interpret this amount as administrative labour.
By looking at the rst branch we can see the production function exhibits increas-
ing returns to scale if  > 0 and constant returns to scale if  = 0.13
Labour is acquired in perfectly competitive market and, given the fact that it is
the only cost source, we can obtain the value of total costs as
TCi(j) = w:Ni(j). (15)
The rm also takes into account the e¤ect of the market-clearing condition for
good j, given by equation (12), on the residual demand it faces, i.e. it considers the












Given the market structure described above, this rm takes the quantities pro-
duced by its competitors within the same industry as given:
yk(j) = yk(j); k (j) 6= i (j) 2 = (j) ; (17)
and the prices posted by its competitors in other industries:
p (s) = p (s) ; s 6= j 2 [0; n] . (18)
Finally, considering its reduced size in the economy as a whole, rm i (j) takes
macroeconomic variables as given:
D = D; P = P ; n = n. (19)
13See appendix 2.
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From solving the prot maximisation problem given by equations (13) to (19), we
obtain the optimal price-setting rule for good j that corresponds to equalising the











where Si(j)  yi(j)=
X
r(j)2=(j)
yr(j) represents the market share of rm i (j).
2.1.5 Microeconomic symmetric equilibria
Let us now assume all rms are identical, i.e. marginal productivity of labour is the
same in all of them. Furthermore, we normalise it to one unit of good j per unit of
labour:
Ai(j) = A = 1; 8i (j) 2 = (j) ; 8j 2 [0; n] .
Therefore, in equilibrium there is no reason for any asymmetry to persist amongst
rms of the same industry. Thus, we obtain Si(j) = 1=m (j) in all industries. So we
say there is a symmetric intra-industrial equilibrium.
However, if all the rms are identical in all industries, facing identical demand
functions, then we also have a symmetric inter-industrial equilibrium. Consequently
and for sake of simplicity, we assume the number of rms in each industry is the same
(m (j) = m, 8j 2 [0; n]).
Therefore, we can re-write the optimal price-setting rule for good j, given by
(20) and the same for all the other goods in the economy due to the inter-industrial
symmetry (p (j) = p, 8j 2 [0; n]), as
p: (1  ) = w
A
, (20.a)
where   (p MC) =p = 1= (:m) 2 [0; 1) is the Lerner index that represents
market power of each rm in each industry. Note this index gives us the reciprocal
of the (absolute value of the) price-elasticity of demand faced by each producer in a
symmetric equilibrium. In the perfect competition case (m ! 1 or  ! 1)14 we
have  = 0, i.e. p = MC. In and extreme case of monopoly (m = 1 and  = 1),
we would have  = 1, i.e. each rm may post an innitely high price relative to the
marginal cost. The higher the vale of , the higher the representative rms market
power.
14In order for perfect competition in goods and inputs markets may subsist in the long run, there
can be no increasing returns to scale. Thus, we also have to assume that  = 0 in this case.
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2.1.6 Macroeconomic constraints
Firstly, labour market has to be in equilibrium15. Thus, the (ex-post) equality between
the quantities of labour supplied and demanded has to hold:






Notice that N gives us private-sector labour demand (both productive and "ad-
ministrative"). Taking into account equilibrium symmetry, labour demand is given
by 	+ n:m: (y + ), where y stands for the equilibrium output of each rm.
We will use value added of each rm in order to dene an aggregate-output con-
cept. Considering the initial assumption that no intermediate outputs exist here,
value added of rm i (j) (V Ai(j)), measured in terms of consumption baskets, is given










In a symmetric equilibrium we have Y = n:m:p:y=P . Note that, taking into
account equation (7) and equilibrium symmetry, we obtain P = n=(1 ):p. By sub-
stituting it in equation (16), we nally obtain the fundamental identity of national
accounting Y = D.16
We have also the value of non-wage income given by the sum of the prots of all







Finally, as in any other general-equilibrium model, we have to choose one good to
be the numéraire. We choose the CES basket for that role, so that P = 1.
2.2 The initial general equilibrium
2.2.1 Some basic relations
Given the choice of the numéraire and given the mass of industries, we can obtain
the price posted in each industry:
15Imperfect competition cannot, by itself, generate unemployment equilibria.
16This result does not depend upon microeconomic equilibrium simmetry, but it is more easily





Note this price diverges from the general level when there is some taste for variety
( > 0)17.
Using equation (20.a), we can obtain the equilibrium (real) wage rate that is
represented by the following expression, given the mark-up level:
w = (1  ) :n

1  . (25)
Here, besides the love-for-variety e¤ect, we can observe that a larger market power
implies a smaller wage, as it contracts labour demand. The corresponding aggregate
labour demand can be written as a function of aggregate output, the mass of indus-
tries, and the number of rms per industry:
L = Y +	+ n:m:, (26)
where the rst term on the right-hand side corresponds to the directly productive
labour input in the private sector, the second one represents unproductive labour,
and the last one is the private-sector "administrative" labour, i.e. the overhead xed
cost for the economy.
Aggregate prots can also be re-written as
 = :Y   (1  ) :n:m:, (23.a)
i.e. it is an increasing function of both the aggregate output and the mark-up level,
and a decreasing function of both the mass of industries and the number of rms per
industry.
2.2.2 A general formulation for the equilibrium
In order to deal with the various models that are nested in this general framework, we
will write down the equilibrium values for the wage rate, employment, and non-wage
income as functions of the government-consumption level and also of other variables
and parameters. We will not have to explicitly dene these functions given the fact
that we are only interested on the e¤ects of scal policy:
w = w (G; ) ;
L = L (G; ) ;
 = (G; ) ;
(27)
where asterisks identify the macroeconomic-equilibrium values for these variables.
17See appendix 3.
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Given the variety of scal-policy behaviour types considered in equations (10.I to
III), have still to consider that:
	 = 	(G; ) in case I;
T 0 = T0 (G; ) in case II (	 = 0);
t = t (G; ) in case III (	 = 0 and T0 = 0).
(28)
Using the fundamental identity of national accounting, the aggregate-demand def-
inition, the consumption function, and the government budget constraint given above,
we can write an equation that gives us the equilibrium value for aggregate output:
Y = C fw (G; ) : [1  t (G; )] ;(G; ) : [1  t (G; )]  T0 (G; )g+G. (29)
From this equation we can easily see that the equilibrium value for output is given
by Y  = Y (G; ).
Once we have found the value of Y , we can obtain all the additional equilibrium
values that depend on it, namely C and U, the latter representing the equilibrium
value for householdsutility (welfare).
2.3 Fiscal policy e¤ectiveness
From equation (29) we can obtain the value of the output government-consumption



















0 in case ;
(1  t:k) :dG in cases II and III.
dt =

0 in cases I and II;
1 g:k
Y  :dG in case III;
and g = G=Y  2 [0; 1) is the weight of public consumption in aggregate expenditure.
We can expect k to be positive in most cases, but the main goal of this section
is analysing it in specic situations, according to the various hypothesis advanced
by many authors from the middle 1980s onwards. Furthermore, we are especially
interested in the e¤ect of the market power on scal policy e¤ectiveness, i.e. we will





Finally, the analysis of scal policy e¤ectiveness on households welfare can simply
be done in the following way: if k > 0, then an expansionary scal policy will
imply a leisure loss, as labour is the only input. Thus, welfare will only increase if i)
private consumption positively reacts to an increase in public consumption and ii) if
that increase is su¢ ciently valued by households so it more than o¤sets the previous
leisure reduction.
In the next sub-section we will survey the main results of this strand of literature.
2.4 A brief survey of the literature
2.4.1 The initiators: Dixon and Mankiw
We may a¢ rm the rst works exclusively dedicated to this topic are Dixon (1987)
and Mankiw (1988), which share the following assumptions:
1. A Cobb-Douglas utility function
U = C:Z1  with 0 <  < 1. (1.A)
2. Absence of income-dependent taxes (t = 0).
3. Absence of taste for variety ( = 0).
4. A monopolistic-competition market structure (m = 1), i.e. a constant mark-up
given by  = 1=.
5. A xed mass of industries (n).





i.e. the marginal propensity to consume is constant and identical for all types of




With a constant mark-up and no love for variety, the equilibrium wage rate is also
constant and given by18 w = 1   . Thus, we know this equilibrium wage will not
react to scal policy, i.e. wG = 0.
From equation (23.a) the reaction of non-wage income to scal policy is given by
G = :k
.




1  : > 1, (30.A1)
18See equation (25)
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Figure 1: The Multiplier in the Dixon-Mankiw Model - Case I
in case I, where government can increase its consumption without rising taxes on
households (dT 0 = 0). Consequently, we conclude that, in this case, a unit increase
in G leads to an increase in equilibrium aggregate output of 1=(1 :) > 1. Further-
more, note that this increase is larger than the one that would occur under perfect
competition ( = 0 and  = 0), where it would be equal to 1.
We can better explain what happens by using Figure 1 below.
First, consider that in the initial equilibrium government expenditure is zero (G =
0) and prots are also zero ( = 0). On the left-hand panel we can depict the
microeconomic decision in the leisure-consumption space using two simple graphical
tools: the upward-sloping income-expansion path and the downward-sloping budget
constraint. The former corresponds to equating the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption (MRSZ;C  UZ=UC = (1  ) :C=[:Z] in this
model) to the real net wage (!N = 1   in this model). The later is just taken from
equation (4), given the equilibrium values for the wages, prots, and taxes.
Thus, the microeconomic equilibrium for the representative household is given
by point E0 where it chooses an amount of leisure equal to Z0 and an amount of
consumption given by C0 . Since there is government consumption, the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium in this space is represented by a "production possibilities frontier"
between output and leisure that is given by the Y = C schedule, the same as the
household budget constraint. On the right-hand panel, we can represent the increas-
ing relationship between total income and prots that corresponds to equation (23.a)
Now, let us introduce government consumption given by G > 0. The rst e¤ect on
the left-hand panel is that the macroeconomic-equilibrium representation is now dif-
ferent from the microeconomic one, i.e. the Y = C+G curve stands above households
14
budget constraint. Using the same amount of labour (leisure), the macroeconomic
equilibrium is now given by point A. That increase in demand leads to an increase
in prots, as represented by point A in the right-hand panel. Thus, the microeco-
nomic budget constraint would shift upwards and households would increase both
leisure and consumption. But then, the macroeconomic constraint would also shift
upwards, prots would increase and so on until the process ends in a new equilibrium
represented by points E1 (in both panels) and E1(in the left-hand panel).
In a nutshell: when scal authorities stimulate aggregate demand through an
increase in public consumption in the amount of one unit, there is an "initial" increase
in output of the same amount (here, in case I). However, the mechanism does not
stop there, as a larger aggregate income implies larger prots that are distributed
to households. Consequently, households initiate a new "round" of the mechanism
as the increase consumption, in the amount of  units, that will stimulate aggregate
demand once more, that stimulates output...
However, for output to increase, it is necessary that private-sector employment
(N) increases. Apparently, there is a contradiction with the graphical results as
leisure also increases. Nonetheless, a larger level of public consumption implies a
smaller level of unproductive public employment, as we can see in equation (10.I),
given by 	 = (T0  G) = (1  ) in this case where T0 is xed.
Thus, despite the fact that L, total employment, decreases due to the negative
e¤ect of higher prots, there is an employment transfer from the public sector to the
private sector that more than o¤sets the decrease in L19 and leads to an increase in
N .
Let us now we assume that government cannot increase its consumption without




1  : > 0, (30.A2)
i.e. a unit increase in G induces an equilibrium output increase of 0 < 1    <
(1  ) = (1  :) < 1.
Figure 2 pictures the multiplier mechanism in a similar way to Figure 1. However,
the initial demand stimulus is now also perceived by households as a tax increase, since
dT 0 = dG. Thus, the microeconomic budget constraint shifts down by the amount
of lump-sum taxes (G). The negative income e¤ect moves the optimal decision of
households from E0 to A, reducing both consumption and leisure. Nonetheless, the
macroeconomic Y = C + G curve does not move, and that means output increases
19Remember that 1= (1  ) > 1.
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Figure 2: The Multiplier in the Dixon-Mankiw Model - Case II
to point A. Consequently, prots increase, as shown by point Ain the right-hand
panel, and another "round" of the multiplier mechanism is set in motion. At the end
of the day, the new equilibrium is given by points E1 (in both panels) and E1(in the
right-hand panel).
In this case, the "initial" demand stimulus of one unit of government consumption
is partially crowded out, leading to a output increase of 0 < 1    < 1 and then to
a prots increase of : (1  ), before the second "round" starts. Notice here the
output increase can be easily explained by the labour-supply side: more government
expenditure means more taxes and these have a positive e¤ect on labour supply that
more than o¤sets the negative e¤ect of prots20. Thus, households are willing to work
longer hours as their disposable income decreases, the same reason that makes them
consume less.
In both these cases (I and II) we observe that scal policy e¤ectiveness on output












(1 :)2 > 0. (31.A)
In order to explain what happens, let us use Figure 3 that refers to case I.
This gure is very similar to Figure 1, but it assumes a larger mark-up level
(1 > 0), i.e. a smaller elasticity of substitution amongst goods. In order to keep
zero prots in the initial equilibrium, we also assume a larger xed cost (1 > 0).
As we can see in the left-hand-side panel, the larger mark-up level induces a smaller
20Remeber that  < 1.
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Figure 3: The Multiplier and the Mark-up in the Dixon-Mankiw Model
equilibrium wage rate, inducing a downward rotation on the income expansion path
around the origin and also a downward rotation of the budget constraint about point
(1,0). On the right-hand side, a larger mark-up rotates the prot function up, but
the larger xed costs shifts it down in a parallel way.
Since the mechanism is similar to the one described in Figure 1, we can notice the
output increase (Y 1  Y 0 ) is larger here than before, with a weaker monopoly power.
So why does this happen? The answer lies on the combination of three e¤ects: i)
there is a negative substitution e¤ect on labour supply due to the lower wage rate;
ii) but the income e¤ect of the lower wage rate is positive; and iii) there is a negative
e¤ect on labour supply due to larger prots. Thus, the crucial e¤ect is the last one: a
higher mark-up induces a larger prot windfall that will lead to a larger consumption
by households, reinforcing the second-round e¤ect of the multiplier.
In case II, where there is no partial substitution of public employment by private
employment, the mechanism of prot distribution is as important as here, but the
e¤ect on labour supply is clear-cut: people would want to increase hours worked by
more than in the case depicted in Figure 2. This is due to the reinforced negative
e¤ect of taxes when the rate is lower.
Given the similitude of this mechanism to the basic Keynesian model, some au-
thors (e.g. Mankiw) identied it with the traditional Keynesian spirit. However,
Dixon (1987) draws our attention to the fact that the economic mechanism that sup-
ports this outcome has much more to do with the Walrasian spirit than with the
Keynesian one. In fact, the consumption-leisure choices made by households are ba-
sically the same under an expansionary scal policy either we face perfect or imperfect
competition. The main di¤erence has to do with non-wage income generated under
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imperfect competition, not in e¤ective demand scarcity. The e¤ect of scal policy on
welfare in case II, the only truly sustainable type of scal policy in a static model, is
clear: output increases by less than public consumption. Thus, private consumption
decreases due to the e¤ect of higher taxes. Therefore, households work harder and
their welfare decreases as a consequence of both e¤ects.
2.4.2 Taxation
One of the critiques to the works of Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988) is the fact that
they use lump-sum taxes to nance government expenditure. Molana and Moutos
(1991) study the e¤ect of proportional taxes in balanced-budget model without un-
productive labour. Thus, the basic assumptions we have here are 	 = 0, T 0 = 0, and
0 < t < 1. All the other assumptions are identical to the previous point.
In what concerns to households, their behavioural functions are now given by
C = : (1  t) :w +
P
, (8.B)
L = 1  (1  ) : (1  t) : w +
w: (1  t) . (9.B)
Given the static equilibrium sustainability issue in a framework with a minimum
of consistency, from this point onwards we assume the government always follows a
balanced-budget rule without recurring to unproductive labour. Here, considering
there are no (net) autonomous taxes, we are in case III, i.e. we have dt = (1  
k:g):dG=Y  to substitute in equation (30).
Thus, we obtain an equilibrium multiplier given by
kBjdt=(1 k:g):dG=Y  =
Y    : (1  +)
B
, (30.B)
where B = Y  : (1  +)+: (1  g) : (1  +   :Y ).21 At rst sight,
the numerator, and also the denominator, appears to be either positive or negative.
However, since we know that C = (1  g):Y  and using equation (8.B) in addition,
we have C = : (1  t) : (1  +). If we also consider that the government
budget constraint implies that t = g, it is simple to see that Y  = : (1  +).
Therefore, kBjdt=(1 k:g):dG=Y  = 0, i.e. scal policy is absolutely ine¤ective in this
case III22.
21Since we know that, in equilibrium, we have   (1  ) <    :Y  =   (1  ) :n: < 0, then
we have B = Y    : (1  +) + : (1  g) : (1  ) : (1  n:). The constraint n: < 1 is a
consequence of having 1  L  N  n:m:  0.
22With the information obtained for the numerator, we know now that B =
: (1  g) : (1  ) : (1  n:) > 0.
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Figure 4: The Multiplier with Proportional Taxes
In Figure 4 we can observe what happens, starting from an initial equilibrium
E0 with G = 0, t = 0, and  = 0. On the left-hand-side panel we now have a
secondary axis to represent the tax rate, a decreasing function of output given G > 0.
Thus, when positive government consumption is introduced, the tax rate increases
from zero to t1 > 0. This implies a downward rotation of both the income expansion
path and the budget constraint. In the new equilibrium E1, private consumption was
completely crowded out by government consumption and output, leisure, and prots
remain unchanged, given the functionals assumed.
So, why is there such a dramatic loss of e¤ectiveness? Contrary to case II, here an
increase in public consumption only presents a potential substitution e¤ect on labour
supply, as it implies a tax-rate increase. However, this tax-rate increase has identical
consequences on prots and wages, as they are both taxed at the same rate. Thus,
the incentive to work more ceases to exist, unless prots decrease. But to have a
decrease in prots, we would need an output fall and that is not compatible with an
increase in employment in this case.
Molana and Moutos (1991) also demonstrate that, when taxes are levied only on
wage income, we may even obtain a negative multiplier.
Considering there is no e¤ect on output, here where there are only distortionary
taxes, private consumption decreases and leisure remains unchanged. Once again,
households welfare is smaller after implementing the expansionary scal policy.
2.4.3 Entry
Once we have explored proportional taxes, let us return to the analysis of scal policy
nance through lump sum taxes (case II).
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Figure 5: The Free-entry Multiplier of Startz
Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988) models assume the economy is in a "short-run"
situation, i.e. rms are not allowed to enter or leave the productive sector. However,
this situation is not sustainable in the "long run," an environment more suitable to
be portrayed by a static model, corresponding to a steady state of a dynamic model.
Startz (1989) presents a "long-run" model using the basic assumptions in both
Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988)23. Thus, the basic assumption here is that the mass
of industries (or varieties), n, is not a constant, but an endogenous variable resulting
from a zero-pure-prots condition. In our case, where there is no uncertainty or
dynamics, since there is no opportunity cost of creating a new rm (or shutting down
and existing one), the condition mentioned can be written as  = 0.
Therefore, non-wage income ceases to respond to scal-policy impulses, as G = 0.
This feature cuts the transmission mechanism though prots into consumption and
from consumption to aggregate demand again. Then, the multiplier is given by
kC jdT 0=dG
G=0
= 1   > 0. (30.C)
This multiplier is still positive, in the (0; 1) interval, but it does not depend on the
existing monopoly-power level in the economy. Thus, in this model scal policy e¤ec-
tiveness would be identical in the Walrasian case ( = 0) and in a highly monopolised
economy (! 1).
23In fact, Startz (1989) uses a Stone-Geary utility function instead of a Cobb-Douglas. However,
the latter can be seen as a particular case of the former and the crucial property for the results
obtained (i.e. constant marginal utility shares) is kept with a much simpler Cobb-Douglas function.
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Figure 5 shows us what is happening in the free-entry model. There is no need
for the right-hand-side panel as prots are compressed to zero by entry and exit.
Thus, an increase in G shifts the microeconomic budget constraint down and the
income e¤ect of higher taxes induce an increase in labour supply and a decrease in
consumption. Therefore, aggregate output increases, but there is a partial crowding
out of private consumption of  units for each unit of government consumption.
We can also notice that a change in  moves the income expansion path and the
budget constraint, but it does not alter the result in terms of scal policy e¤ectiveness
as they both rotate in the same proportion like in the at-rate-tax case.
Furthermore, we can observe the free-entry (or "long-run") multiplier, given by






= 1  : < 1.
As we saw when comparing both models with the same lump-sum tax nancing
public expenditure, the main di¤erence between these two types of model is the
way prots distribution a¤ects private consumption. Once this mechanism is shut
down, only the income e¤ect in labour supply subsists to increase output, with the
preferences assumed.
2.4.4 Preferences
The main result of Startz (1989) is extremely appealing, as it eliminates the multiplier
pure-prot mechanism.
However, Dixon and Lawler (1996) demonstrate that conclusion is clearly depen-
dent on the type of preferences assumed for households24. If we keep the assumptions
in Startz (1989), what some authors call the Dixon-Mankiw-Startz (DMS) framework,
with the exception of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, we can see the no-entry mul-





which is positive and less than one if we assume the marginal propensity to consume
of net non-wage income is restricted to the (0; 1) interval, as in the particular case of
the DMS framework where CN = .
Considering free entry, we obtain the "long-run" multiplier given by
24In fact, that article also demonstrates Startzs result also depends upon the production technol-




= 1  CN > 0, (30.D2)
which was constant and equal to 1   in Startz (1989) particular case.
Assuming u () still represents homothetic preferences, the graphical representa-
tions are similar to Figures 2 and 5 and the only di¤erence is that the income ex-
pansion path is now given by C = (1  ) :Z, where  () is a general increasing
function. If we assume preferences are not homothetic, the income expansion path
becomes non-linear, but the outcomes are identical.






= 1  CN : < 1,
and this result is also easily explained by the neutralisation of the prot e¤ect25.
Thus, the previous results are similar to the DMS framework and we only have
to substitute  by CN . However, in general, the marginal propensity to consume of
prots depends upon the mark-up. Therefore, the "long-run" scal multiplier is the
larger (smaller) the larger is the market power in the economy, when CN is decreasing
(increasing) with .
Let us study an example using the utility function in Heijdra and van der Ploeg
















from which we can easily observe the marginal propensity to consume previously
referred is not constant, but it is an endogenous variable that depends on the equilib-
rium value of the real wage rate: CN = (1 + a
":w1 ")
 1. Notice also that  (1  ) =
[(1  ) =a]" in this case.
Considering that we have w = 1  , this marginal propensity is decreasing (in-
creasing) with the mark-up when the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure (") is less (more) than one. Thus, scal policy is more (less) e¤ective the
25Dixon and Lawler (1996) also demonstrate this is not always the case when production technol-
ogy does not exhibit constant marginal returns.
26As we will see further on, this is not the only new thing introduced in this article.
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Figure 6: The Mark-up and the Equilibrium with CES Preferences
more imperfect competition is in this economy. However, di¤erent preferences may
lead to di¤erent results.
We can see what happens using Figure 6. Consider an initial mark-up given by
0 and three sets of parameters:
- In set I we have "I = 1 and aI = 1  . This corresponds to the case analysed in
Startz (1989).












Notice that we have i (1  0) = (1  ) = for all i = I; II; III. Thus, the
graphical representation of the initial equilibrium with  = 0 is the same for the
three cases and it would also be the same after using scal policy (see Figure 5).
However, for 1 = 0 there is a di¤erence: the income expansion path rotates at
di¤erent rates.
We can see what happens to the functions i (1  ) on the right-hand-side panel.
For a unit elasticity of substitution, as in the Cobb-Douglas case, this function is linear
in . However, it becomes concave (convex) for values of " smaller (greater) than one.
This, the substitution e¤ect of scal policy will be quite di¤erent in these three cases,
when the mark-up varies.
Figure 7 presents the output multiplier for cases II and III.
In case III, the small elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
means that a larger mark-up does not have a signicant e¤ect on the income expansion
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Figure 7: The Mark-up and the Multiplier with CES Preferences
path, when compared to the initial situation. In case II, a larger mark-up means a
larger substitution e¤ect. Thus, considering the e¤ect on the budget constraint is the
same in both cases, an increase in government consumption induces a higher increase
in labour supply in case II than in case III. A larger elasticity of substitution means
that households are willing to accept a higher reduction in leisure (and a smaller
decrease in consumption) in order to respond to the corresponding tax increase.
2.4.5 Increasing returns to variety
Let us now return to the functionals assumed in the DMS framework. However, we
assume there is some taste for variety, i.e.  > 0. In this case, equation (25) tell us
that, for a given mark-up level, the real wage is an increasing function of the mass of
goods existing in the economy.
This type of models, considering the love-for-variety assumption, is treated in
Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996)27. For sake of simplicity, we treat these two e¤ects
separately. Devereux et al. (1996) present a dynamic model where a similar e¤ect
arises from increase returns to specialisation, a kind of love for (intermediate-inputs)
variety in the production function.
When the mass of rms and goods (n) is xed, i.e. when there is no entry or exit,
the scal multiplier is still given by equation (30.A2). However, if rms are free to






;  = 
+ 1 2 [0; ] , (32)
27The authors also use the CES utility function used in the previous section.
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Figure 8: The Multiplier with a Varying Real Wage
a result that is obtained through the free-entry condition  = 0.
Thus, an aggregate demand increase induces an increase in real wages that will







: [1  (1  ) :g] :k > 0,
i.e. entry of rms, a consequence of the aggregate demand stimulus, leads to a real
wage increase and consequently to a consumption increase, opening a transmission






1  : [1  (1  ) :g]  0. (30.E)
Notice that, due to  > 0 we have  > 0 and consequently a larger multiplier than
in the free-entry constant-returns case (1  ).
On the left-hand-side panel of Figure 8 we can observe that scal policy would
change the equilibrium from point E0 to point A. That is the situation depicted in
Figure 5, corresponding to a xed-wage environment. However, point A is not an
equilibrium in this model, as the real wage is a function of the aggregate output w =

(Y ) with 
0 () > 0. This fact can easily be observed by combining equations (25)
and (32). Therefore, a higher output induce new rms to enter and that stimulates
28See appendix 4.
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aggregate demand via private consumption in the case of love for variety and labour
demand in the case of increasing returns to specialisation. In any case, the equilibrium
wage rate goes up, as we can observe on the secondary axes of the right-hand-side
panel of Figure 8. The wage increase rotates the income expansion path, the household
budget constraint, and the macroeconomic constraint up in the left-hand-side panel.
The new equilibrium is nally reached in point E1with a larger output and a smaller
decrease in private consumption.
Despite the fact that we are using a consumption function with constant marginal
propensities to consume, this multiplier depends upon the monopoly power level in
the economy through g and  = := (:+ 1  ). It is simple to demonstrate that
 is increasing with the mark-up29, but it is not easy so show how does g depends
on . A rst glance, one could think the weight of public consumption in output
should be increasing with the monopoly degree, as it means more ine¢ ciency, thus
less output. However, taking into account net prots are zero, the macroeconomic
production function can be represented as
Y = (1  ) :n

 1 :L.
In the equation above we can observe that, for the same employment level, an
increase in  leads to a reduction in the term (1 ), but it also increases the exponent,
as it corresponds to a reduction in . This means that the monopoly degree under
monopolistic competition reinforces the e¤ect of increasing returns. There is also an
indirect e¤ect that acts through n, since an increase in  stimulates entry.
Therefore, we can easily determine what is the e¤ect on the multiplier when we











[1  : (1  )]2
 0.
In this particular case, the larger is the market power, the larger is the entry
e¤ect on the real wage, increasing the e¤ectiveness of the initial scal stimulus. An
identical outcome can be obtained for situations where g does not react dramatically
to changes in the mark-up. Using numerical simulations with plausible values for the
parameters, we also obtain a multiplier that is an increasing function of .













Considering that  and g depends upon the values of other parameters in the
model, it is not possible to say a priori if this value is larger of smaller than one.
Thus, we know that for  < :[1 (1 ):g
]

the free-entry ("long-run") multiplier is
larger than the multiplier with a xed mass of rms, given the positive externality
caused by the entry of new rms. The opposite result is obtained when the mark-up
is high.
2.4.6 Endogenous mark-ups
The assumption that entry of rms is done through the creation of new monopolies
associated to new products hides an additional assumption that product innovation
is cheaper than copying an existing good or creating a close substitute. When facing
signicant costs associated with creating a di¤erentiated product, the incentive to
create a new industry may be smaller than the incentive to enter an existing industry.
Thus, m may be the endogenous variable in our free-entry model instead of n.30
Up to this point, we considered that  was an exogenous variable, as we assumed
m was xed and equal to one (a basic assumption in monopolistically competitive
models). When we alter the endogenous variable in the entry process, we also endo-
genise  = 1= (:m). This value can be obtained through the zero-prot condition,





where  = n:=Y  is an increasing returns to scale indicator for the production
function and it represents the weight of total xed costs in aggregate output. We can
notice its equilibrium value is a decreasing function of the equilibrium output. Note
that, in this case, the market power has a negative correlation with aggregate output,
which is consistent with counter-cyclical mark-ups as documented in the empirical
literature31.
Despite the fact this hypothesis is considered in Dixon and Lawler (1996), the
treatment of scal-policy e¤ectiveness in an endogenous-mark-up framework is done
in Costa (2004). However, there are other endogenous-mark-ups models, though not
specically dedicated to scal-policy e¤ectiveness, that are surveyed in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999).
In the case treated here, it is the real wage that reacts to scal policy, as we have
w = 1   . Nonetheless, considering the reduced-form macroeconomic production
function with free entry Y = (1  ) :L, the endogenous mark-up may work as a
30For a more detailed analysis of the underlying process and its fundamentals see Costa and Dixon
(2007).
31E.g. see Martins et al. (1996) or Martins and Scarpetta (2002).
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productivity shock, but it originates in the aggregate-demand side in the case of
scal policy32.
Thus, an increase in public consumption translates into a mark-up reduction, i.e.
a real-wage increase wG = (
)2 :k= (n:) > 0. Therefore, the increase in intra-
industrial competition induced by an expansionary scal policy leads to an second
stimulus in private consumption, via real wages, reinforcing the multiplier mechanism









The graphical representation of this mechanism is also given by Figure 8, where
w = 
(Y ) is obtained from equation (33). Despite the di¤erence in the economic
mechanism, the real-wage transmission mechanism is similar to the previous model.
Considering that  is now an endogenous variable, it makes no sense to calculate
the derivative of this multiplier in order to the mark-up. However, any change in
the parameter values or exogenous variables that leads to a higher mark-up (e.g. a
smaller public consumption or a higher xed cost) induces an increase in scal policy
e¤ectiveness.












Thus, near the initial equilibrium where  = , the "long-run" multiplier is larger
than the "short-run" one, as long as the monopoly power indicator is su¢ ciently large,
i.e. as long as  > :n:.
Molana and Zhang (2001) study the steady-state e¤ects in an intertemporal model
similar to Costa (2004), where they assume that  =  (n) with 0 (n) < 0. In a way
similar to Galí (1995), these authors assume that there is imperfect competition in
intermediate goods markets used to produce nal goods and where a larger mass of
varieties increases the elasticity of substitution amongst them. Despite the di¤erent
endogenous mark-up generation mechanism, the qualitative results are similar33.
In both the endogenous mark-up and the taste for variety (or increasing returns
to specialisation) cases, scal policy (or aggregate demand management policy in
32There is an recent interest in this subject in the business-cycle literature. For an example, see
Barro and Tenreyro (2006), inter alia.
33Chen et al. (2005) present a model that intends to extend the DMS framework to an endogenous-
mark-up situation. However, as Costa and Palma (2007) notice, their model does not hold an
endogenous mark-up mechanism, only a public-consumption externality in the production function.
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general) have a positive e¤ect on the e¢ ciency level in the economy. This allows the
balanced-budget multiplier to be greater than one and simultaneously, for a given
employment level, the output to be larger. Consequently, taking into account the
multiplier e¤ect of public over private consumption is given by k 1, it is possible to
obtain a positive nal e¤ect on households consumption. For the same reason, leisure
will not decrease so much as in the previous cases.
Therefore, it is possible that scal policy, without any direct externalities, has a
positive e¤ect on households welfare as long as: i) the e¤ect of the e¢ ciency gain is
large enough to guarantee that k > 1 and ii) the increase in private consumption is
su¢ ciently important to o¤set the reduction in leisure.
2.4.7 Extensions and generalisations
Many additional works try to analyse the relationship between market power and
scal policy e¤ectiveness, but we cannot go through all of them here. However, some
of the most interesting results can be briey described in this section.
Amongst static models, Molana and Montagna (2000) introduce heterogeneity in
the marginal product of labour in a DMS-style framework, also keeping love for vari-
ety. There, the zero-prot condition only applies to the "marginal rm (industry),"
the reason why its more e¢ cient competitors present positive prots. In their model,
the absence of taste for variety leads to the entry of less e¢ cient rms, so it reduces
the average e¢ ciency of the economy and also scal policy e¤ectiveness. Love for
variety tends to oppose this e¤ect.
Still considering static models, Torregrosa (1998) supplies a demonstration for the
conjecture in Molana and Moutos (1991) stating that a negative multiplier can be
obtained when there exist only proportional taxes on labour income. Reinhorn (1998)
studies optimal scal policy in a framework where public consumption directly a¤ects
consumers utility.
Finally, Censolo and Colombo (2008) study the way scal policy e¤ectiveness is
inuenced by di¤erences between the composition of private and public expenditures,
when di¤erent market structures (perfect and monopolistic competition) exist simul-
taneously in the same economy.
3 Intertemporal models
In the following section, we will develop a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium




In particular, the instantaneous household utility follows as before: 1 and 2 with
 = 0: The innitely-lived household has a discount rate of  > 0 and, instead of (1),






u [(C () ; Z ()] :e : :d . (34)
In the dynamic model the household owns capital K () at moment  which it rents
out to rms at price r (): hence its total income at time t is as before, labour income
w () :L () and equity prots (), plus the income from capital R () :K ().35
Notice that, with an innitely-living household, Ricardian equivalence holds.
Thus, since we are not interested in studying how public debt evolves overtime, noth-
ing is lost if we assume government follows a balanced-budget rule at each moment
 . Also, for simplicity in this section we will assume that the government nances
expenditure by a lump-sum tax P () :G () = T0 (), i.e. we have 	() = 0 and
t () = 0.
We still consider the preferences for varieties given by equation (2) and the re-
source constraint in equation (3). Therefore, the intertemporal budget constraint can
be simply expressed in terms of aggregate variables. The household can choose to
allocate its income between consumption, paying tax or accumulating capital. The
accumulation of capital is thus:
_K () =
w () :L () +R () :K () +  ()
P ()
  C () G () . (35)
For simplicity we ignore time indices () from this point onwards. Also, we continue
to choose the composite good as numéraire, so P () = 1.
3.2 Firm and production
The representative rms decision is inherently static, since it rents capital from the
household. Each instant  , the rm employs labour and capital to produce output:
yi(j) = max

F (Ki(j); Ni(j))  
	
. (36)
34This model is based on lecture notes by Huw Dixon "Imperfect competition and macroeco-
nomics" used for PhD courses given at a variety of institutions, including Finnish Doctoral Pro-
gramme 1996, ISEG/TULisbon 1999, Munich (CES ifo) 2000, as well as York and Cardi¤.
35We ignore depreciation of capital in order to keep the presentation simple. Considering a positive
depreciation rate,  > 0, does not change the quality of results.
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where we assume that FK > 0, FN > 0, FKK < 0, FNN < 0, FKN > 0, also that
function F () is homogeneous to degree 1 (HoD1), i.e. the technology would present
constant returns to scale (CRtS) if  was equal to zero, and the Inada conditions hold.
The rm faces the demand curve (16). Given the real wage and rental on capital,
the rst order conditions for prot maximization imply (in a symmetric industry
equilibrium):
(1  ) :FKi(j) = R; (1  ) :FNi(j) = w. (37)
Since the marginal products of labour and capital are the same across all rms (this is
ensured by competitive factor markets), we can rewrite the households accumulation
equation using (37) as
_K = (1  ) : (FN :N + FK :K) +   C  G.
Since function F () HoD1 in (K;N), by Eulers Theorem36 we have:
_K = (1  ) :F (K;N) +   C +G.
Furthermore, in a symmetric equilibrium where p (j) = P = 1, the prots of each
rm are simply:
i(j) = p (j) :yi(j)   TCi(j) =
= yi(j)   w:Ni(j)  R:Ki(j) =
=

F (Ki(j); Ni(j))  











so that aggregating across all rms we have












represents total demand for capital. Again, equilibrium in the labour market implies
that N = L.
Under imperfect competition, a wedge is driven between the marginal product of
each factor and the factor return: this leads to each additional unit of output yielding
a marginal prot of  (since only a proportion (1  ) is used to pay for labour and
capital. There is also the overhead xed cost, which may make the prot per rm
negative or positive, depending upon the level of output.
36When F () is HoD1, F (K;N) = FK :K + FN :N .
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3.3 The households intertemporal optimization
The household chooses (C(); L()) to maximize lifetime utility (34) subject to the
accumulation equation (35), in e¤ect a dynamic budget constraint. The current-value
Hamiltonian for this intertemporal optimisation problem is
H = u(C; 1  L) + : (w:L+R:K +  C  G) ,
The rst-order conditions for this are
HC  uC    = 0;
HL   uZ + :w = 0;




e : : () :K ()

= 0.
Using (37) we can express (w;R) in terms of the marginal products. Hence, we
derive two basic optimality conditions:
Intra-temporal optimality Once again37, M (C;Z) ;the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure equals the net real wage rate
M (C;Z)  uZ
uC
= (1  ) :FN .
Inter-temporal optimality The Euler condition. Assuming that uCZ = 0, i.e.
assuming the felicity function is additively separable, this can be written as
_C
C
= : [(1  ) :FK   ] ,
where    uC=(C:uCC) is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consump-
tion.
3.4 Steady State
In the steady state, we have the condition that _C = 0: Hence the Euler condition
implies that
(1  ) :F K = ,
where asterisks stand for steady-state values. In the Walrasian case ( = 0) this
is just the modied golden rule. What imperfect competition does is to discourage
37See appendix 1.
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investment, since the returns on investment are depressed (there is a wedge between
the marginal product and the rental on capital.
Now, under the assumption that function F () is HoD1, we can write it in factor






= L:f(k), where k  K=L. Hence the steady-
state Euler condition is
f 0 (k) =

1   , (39)













Let us now consider the special case of monopolistic competition where every
industry is a monopoly, i.e. m () = 1. In this case, given the CES preferences in (2),
the mark-up is also constant and given by  () =  = 1=.
With this particular market structure we can write the solution to this as k =
k () with k0 < 0. With F () HoD1, the steady-state Euler condition is very
powerful: not only is the marginal product of capital determined, but so is the steady-
state wage rate
w() = f [k ()]  :k
 ()
1   . (40)
With this we have the income expansion path (IEP) for consumption and leisure,
dened by the intertemporal optimality condition and the steady state wage
uZ
uC
= (1  ) :F N = w () . (41)
As in the static model, the IEP will be upward sloping in (Z;C), since both con-
sumption and leisure are normal; it will be linear if preferences are quasi-homothetic;
it will be a linear ray through the origin if preferences are homothetic.
There is a steady-state relationship between income and consumption given by38:
C = L:f [k ()]  n: G. (42)
We will call this the Euler frontier (EF).
38This can be derived from the budget constraint:
C = w () :L +R:K +  G =
= w () :L +

1  L:k
 () + :L:f (k)  n: G =
= L:f (k ())  n: G.
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Figure 9: The Steady-State Equilibrium
Note that the EF is not the households budget constraint (BC). Let us take the
case of where the number of rms is xed. The household receives prot income ,
which it sees as a lump-sum payment, and also the rental income on capital. The
household thus only sees the variation in labour income as it considers varying L:
the slope of the actual budget constrain is thus w(). The actual budget constraint
is given by the grey dotted line in Figure 9: if the household is at point E0, it is atter
than the EF. Also, at the intercept there is all of the non-labour income (rental on
capital, prots less tax).
The unique steady-state equilibrium is the found at the intersection of the IEP
and EF at point E0, as depicted in the same gure39. Here we can see the equilibrium
level of C and L = 1 Z. The optimal capital stock is then simply K = L:k().
3.4.1 Dynamics
Whilst the steady state is best understood in terms of leisure-consumption space, the
dynamics is best understood in the classic Ramsey projection (K;C). As a rst step,
we need to note that the intratemporal relationship means that we can dene labour
supply as an implicit function of (C;K) : L = L(C;K; ); with LC < 0 < LK and
L < 0.40
39Uniqueness is not guaranteed when we have a signi¢ cant taste for variety, i.e.  is large, when




Figure 10: The Saddle-Point Stable Equilibrium
The dynamics are represented by the two isoclines:
_C = 0 : (1  ) :FK [K;L (C;K; )]   = 0; (43)
_K = 0 : F [K;L (C;K; )]  n: G  C = 0. (44)
The consumption isocline is downward sloping in (K;C): it is dened by the equality
of the marginal revenue product of capital being equal to the discount rate. To the
right of the consumption isocline, consumption is falling, since (1  ) :FK < ; to the
left it is increasing. The capital isocline has the standard upward-sloping shape41: it
need not be globally concave due to the e¤ect of K on the labour supply. The phase
diagram thus has a unique saddle-path solution as depicted in Figure 10.
3.5 The e¤ect of imperfect competition on the long-run equi-
librium
In this section we illustrate the e¤ect of a change in  on the steady-state equilibrium
from both (1  L;C) space and (K;C) space. First, let us analyse the consequences
of imperfect competition in leisure-consumption space. We have two e¤ects of an
increase in the degree of imperfect competition:
41See appendix 7. Notice that with  > 0 the capital isocline would present the usual hump shape:
increasing before the modied golden-rule capital stock and decreasing afterwards.
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Figure 11: Market Power and the Steady-State Equilibrium (I)
 The EF curve rotates anti-clockwise. Since we have







(1  ):f 00 (k) =

(1  )2:f 00 (k) < 0.
 The real wage falls, so that the IEP moves to the right. Since from (40)









These two e¤ects are depicted in Figure 11, where the equilibrium moves from E0
to E1 when we compare a low-markup steady-state ( = 0) with a large-markup one
( = 1 > 0).
Clearly, the shift in the IEP represents a pure substitution e¤ect. As the wage
falls, the household substitutes leisure for consumption. The EF rotation, however,
marks a counterbalancing income e¤ect: income is lower for any L when  is higher.
This operates to increase labour supply and decrease consumption. So, both income
and substitution e¤ects operate to reduce consumption: they operate in opposite ways
on the labour supply. In Figure 11 leisure increases, which means that the income
e¤ect dominates for that specic example.
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Figure 12: Market Power and the Steady-State Equilibrium (II)
Turning to capital-consumption space and the phase diagram, the way to under-
stand the e¤ect of  is via the e¤ect on L: for given (K;C), an increase in  increases
the wedge between the marginal product of labour and the wage, hence leading to a
reduction in the labour supply. Less labour means that both total output and the
marginal product of capital fall. Hence we have two e¤ects of an increase in :
 The consumption isocline shifts to the left (since FK falls as L decreases).
 The capital isocline shifts downwards, as there is less output given (K;C).
The shift from equilibrium E0 to E1 in Figure 11 is represented in (K;C) in Figure
12. Note that whilst steady-state consumption falls, the e¤ect on capital is potentially
ambiguous. This is because the e¤ect of  on labour supply is ambiguous. Here capital
decreases, which is compatible with the reduction in employment observed in Figure
11.
3.6 Free Entry
Until now, we have assumed that the number of rms is xed across time, so that
n() = n. In this case, aggregate output is given by:
Y () = L () :f [k()]  n:. (45)
If there is instantaneous free entry which drives prots to zero, from (38), for given







:L () :f [k()] . (46)
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Figure 13: Steady-State Equilibrium with Free Entry (I)
In this case, aggregate output is given by
Y () = (1  ) :F [K(); L()] = (1  ) :L () :f [k()] . (47)
Let us turn to leisure-income space. Free entry does not a¤ect the IEP, which
just depends on the real wage w () which is not inuenced by entry. However,
entry does a¤ects the Euler frontier (42) since the level aggregate overheads n:
varies according to (46). In factor-intensive notation, we have the "Free Entry Euler
Frontier", FEEF for short: In the case of free-entry, this simplies to
C = L: (1  ) :f [k()] G (48)
The FEEF is steeper than the EF: a higher labour supply means that there are more
rms which increases the socially wasteful overhead n: thus reducing consumption
by more than if the number of rms is xed. The two lines meet at the labour supply
where the free entry number of rms happens to be equal to the exogenously given
number of rms42: for labour supplies below this the FEEF lies above the EF (since
there are less rms); for labour supplies above this the FEEF lies below the EF. This
is depicted in Figure 13, where EF and FEEF intersect at point E.








Figure 14: Steady-State Equilibrium with Free Entry (II)
If we turn to (K;C) space, free entry does not inuence the consumption isocline
(since overheads do not inuence the marginal product of capital). The capital isocline
becomes
_K = 0 : (1  ) :F [K;L(C;K; )]  C  G = 0. (49)
The capital isocline is a¤ected: the xed n isocline is steeper and intersects the free-
entry isocline at the capital stock where the number of rms under free entry equals
the xed n (which isK

). For capital stocks below that, the free entry isocline implies
less overheads and lies above the xed n isocline, and for capital above that level, it
lies below the xed n case. We depict this in gure 14.
Also, we can easily see entry does not a¤ect the dynamics of the steady-state
equilibrium43. Notice the xed-markup monopolistically competitive model with free
entry is formally equivalent to a Ramsey model with more ine¢ cient production
function given by (1  ) :F .
3.7 Fiscal Policy, entry, and imperfect competition.
We will explore the e¤ects of an increase in government expenditure funded by a
lump-sum tax. This will divide into the long-run steady-state e¤ects and the short-
run impact e¤ects, as well as the transition towards the steady state. We will assume
that in the initial position we start o¤ with zero-prots, even in the case of a xed
number of rms. That means that the EF and FEEF both pass through the same
point in steady state, i.e. point E0 in Figure 15.
43See appendix 6.
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Figure 15: Long-Run E¤ects of Fiscal Policy
Turning rst to the long-run steady-state e¤ects of an increase in government
expenditure. In leisure-consumption space, the IEP is una¤ected by the change in G.
The EF and FEEF are both shifted down by a vertical distance equal to the increase
in government expenditure. The new steady states are ENE for a xed number of
rms, and EFE with free entry. As in the static case, the multiplier is "Walrasian"
in the sense of being less than one and greater than zero. The drop in consumption
is less than the increase in government expenditure44. How much less is determined
by the slope of the EF and FEEF: a steeper slope results in more crowding out of
consumption in steady state. This leads us to three simple conclusions:
 The multiplier with free-entry is smaller than the multiplier with a xed number
of rms, since FEEF is steeper than EF. This result is found in Coto-Martinez
and Dixon (2003) for an open economy context.
 Employment increases (leisure decreases) as G increases, and the increase in the
labour supply is greater when there is free entry.
 An increase in imperfect competition makes both the FEEF and the EF atter,
leading to less crowding out and a larger output multiplier in each case.
None of these results requires that the initial steady-state is the same (where the
FEEF and EF intersect) if there are homothetic preferences (and hence a linear IEP).
If the IEP is non-linear, the result will hold if the initial position is the same. The
44See the appendix.
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intuition behind these results is the following. An increase in government spending
nanced by a lump-sum tax makes the household worse o¤: so, it cuts back on the
good things in life, consumption and leisure. Because the economy is less e¢ cient
(at the margin) with free entry, the required e¤ort to supply the extra output to the
government is greater than with xed n, so that consumption and leisure decline more
under free-entry. An increase in imperfect competition means that whether there is
a xed number of rms or free-entry, the weight of the tax burden falls more heavily
on leisure so that the crowding out of consumption is less.
If we compare the steady-states in (1  L;C) space, there is a striking similarity
between the static and dynamic models. Now let us turn to the dynamics of the
model with imperfect competition. In Coto-Martinez and Dixon (2003) these results
are generalised to a small open economy setting.
3.8 Fiscal policy: short-run dynamics.
In (K;C) we have the two accumulation equations which we assume intersect at the
initial steady-state. In this case, the xed-n capital accumulation schedule is steeper
than the free-entry curve, as seen above. The e¤ect of a permanent increase in G is to
shift both curves down vertically in (K;C) space. The new steady-state equilibria are
ENE for xed n and EFE with free entry (these two correspond exactly to the points
with identical notations in Figure 15). We can see that the steady-state capital stock
increases by more when there is free entry: this reects the increase in the labour
supply (decline in leisure) with the same capital/labour ratio in both cases. Since
both ENE and EFE are saddle-point stable, consumption will drop down and follow
an upward sloping path to the new steady state.
In order to compare what happens along the paths in both cases. Considering
 > 0 is the slope of the stable manifold45, we can approximate the consumption
value using the rst-order Taylor expansion:
C () = C + : [K () K] . (50)
We are especially interested in what happens at time  = 0, when the scal shock
occurs. In both cases we observe a decrease in C (0) due to the combination of two
e¤ects: (i) the long-run consumption level decreases as described before and (ii) the
capital stock is below its long-run optimal level (i.e. K (0) < K)46. However, if we
want to compare the no-entry to the free-entry versions of the model, we can notice
that
45See appendix 7 for an algebraic expression.
46See the values for the long-run multipliers in the appendix.
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Figure 16: Short-Run E¤ects of Fiscal Policy
C (0) = C   NE:K + : [K (0) KNE] , (51)
where X  XNE  XFE, XNE = XjNo entry and XFE = XjFree entry. We can see in
Figure 16 that C > 0, i.e. the long-run drop in consumption is larger under free
entry than in the xed-n model. We can also observe that K < 0, i.e. the long-run
increase in the optimal capital stock is larger under free entry. Finally, we know that
K (0) KNE < 0 for the increase in government expenditure depicted in this example.
Thus, we can expect a larger short-run decrease in private consumption in the free
entry case (C (0) < 0), unless the stable manifold is much steeper in the no-entry




Let us use a numerical illustration in order to see what can happen in specic
models. First, we assume the felicity function is isoelastic in both consumption and
leisure, i.e.













where , ,b > 0. Second, let us assume F () is Cobb-Douglas, i.e.
F [K(); N()] = A:K():N()1 ;
where 0 <  < 1. Now, we choose the following parameter values:
     b G0 
1=3 0:04 1 1 10 10=6 0:1643 0:00009
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the value of  was chosen in order to generate a long-run capital share in total
income equal to one third. The value for  implies a 4 per cent return on capital per
period. The values for  and  imply elasticities of intertemporal substitution equal
to one for both consumption and leisure. The value of  gives rise to a 11 per cent
price-wedge over the marginal cost in the steady state. The value for b was chosen in
order to generate L = 1=3, the value for G0 is the one that leads to a 20 per cent
steady-state share of government consumption in output, and the value for  is such
that prots are zero in the initial equilibrium (E0 in Figure16) when n = 1000.
For this numerical illustration, a permanent one per cent increase in G leads to
an immediate 1.3 per cent decrease in consumption in the no-entry case and to a
1.4 reduction in the free-entry case. Thus, in this example, despite the fact that the
stable manifold is steeper in the no-entry case (i.e.  > 0), the last term on the
right-hand-side of equation (51) is smaller than the sum of the positive e¤ects. This
example corresponds to Figure 16: in the no-entry case the equilibrium response of
households leads to the short-run equilibrium represented by point B, whilst point C
represents its no-entry counterpart.
We also varied all the parameters in their ranges and obtained similar results, i.e.
for these functionals we could not numerically generate a situation where C (0) < 0.
Of course we cannot guarantee such an event would not occur with di¤erent felicity
or production functions, but we can expect this result to hold in most of the real
policy experiments.
3.8.1 Extensions and generalisations
As we saw, dynamic models allow us to study not only the long-run (steady-state)
e¤ects, but also the short-run e¤ects that occur due to the fact that agents may use
a part of their resources presently available to obtain better future outcomes, accord-
ing to a discounted optimisation problem (either utility or prots). Amongst these
models, Heijdra (1998) is an inevitable reference, some of the problems approached
here are studied in a dynamic environment. Further interesting results may be found
in Devereux et al. (1996), Harms (2002), Heijdra et al. (1998), Linneman and Sch-
abert (2003), or Molana (1998). The basic link between imperfect competition and
the scal multiplier has been explored by Costa (2007) which nds some evidence
for the fact that whilst there seems to be no signicant correlation between long-run
gross-output (GDP) multipliers, there is a positive correlation if we use a net-output
concept (NDP)47. This contrast is possible because the optimal capital stock is also
a¤ected by both public consumption and mark-ups in a way that capital depreciation
may hide the e¤ect on output measured as GDP.
47Using a panel of 14 OECD countries for the 1970-2000 period.
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4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied scal policy e¤ectiveness in static general equilibrium models
where there is imperfect competition in goods markets. We observed this e¤ective-
ness, both over output and households welfare, and its relation with the degree of
monopoly depend upon a large number of factors, namely the ones analysed here: i)
the way government budget is nanced; ii) the type of taxes used; iii) the possibility
of free entry; iv) consumers preferences; v) the existence of increasing returns on the
mass of varieties; and vi) the existence of endogenous mark-ups. Overall we nd
that the e¤ectiveness of scal policy does indeed depend on the degree of imperfect
competition. This is because the mark-up distorts the relative price of consumption
and leisure (the latter becomes cheaper). For a broad range of results (with many
caveats), we nd that the multiplier is increasing in the degree of imperfect competi-
tion. However, the e¤ect on welfare will still tend to be negative: the reason output
increases is that households are induced to work harder by being taxed. In order
to get the "Keynesian" welfare e¤ect, you need to have some extra ingredient: for
example increasing returns, love for variety, or an endogenous mark-up.
In dynamic models, many of the same issues arise, particularly if we focus on the
steady-state results. However, we have additional dimension of the real-time dynamics
and in particular the comparison of short- and long-run e¤ects. In both static and
dynamic models, the role of entry is crucial, as was argued by Startz (1989). With a
xed mass of varieties, extra output is produced in a marginally e¢ cient way. With
free entry, extra output sucks in additional rms and overheads. In many models this
leads to a lower multiplier and lower welfare.
From the point of view of the history of economic thought it is rather strange
that John Maynard Keynes, Joan Robinson the founder of monopolistic competition
theory, and Richard Khan, who invented the multiplier, coexisted in the same time
and place (Cambridge, England in the 1930s). Despite the space-time and intellectual
proximity between them, the link was not made between imperfect competition and
macroeconomics until much later48. In this survey, we have traced through general
equilibrium macroeconomic models how this "tantalizing possibility" was realised in
the ensuing 60 years. As we have seen, the simple fact that the imperfectly competitive
equilibrium is not Pareto optimal does not imply that Pareto improving scal policy
is generally possible. However, it does have important and more-or-less Keynesian
features as regards the multiplier.
48See Marris (1991) for more details, especially pp. 181-187.
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5.1 Private consumption and labour supply functions
From the second step in the optimisation process, we obtain two rst-order conditions
that imply equalising the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consump-
tion (M) to the real wage:
M (C;Z)  uZ (C;Z)
uC (C;Z)
= !: (1  t)  !N ,
where MC = (uZC   uZC :M) =uC > 0 and MZ = (uZZ   uCZ :M) =uC < 0. Solving
this equation in order to L we obtain
L = 1 H (!N ; C) ,
where H!N = 1=MZ < 0 and HC =  MC=MZ > 0. Thus, taking into account that




> 0; L!N =  H!N  HC :C!N
8<:
> 0 (=  H!N > HC :C!N ;
= 0 (=  H!N = HC :C!N ;




> 0; LN =  HC :CN < 0.
The sign of L!N depends on the traditional relationship between the substitution
e¤ect (given by  H!N > 0) and the income e¤ect (given by  HC :C!N < 0).
5.2 The production function and returns to scale
Let us consider the rst branch of the production function in equation (14) and let us
assume we want to move from a labour utilisation of Li = L0i > =Ai, generating an
output of y0i = Ai:L
0
i   > 0, to another one where Li = :L0i with  > 1. Thus, we
obtain an output for rm i equal to : (Ai:L0i   )+ (   1) : = :y0i + (   1) : 
:y0i . Therefore, if there is no need for an overhead quantity of "administrative"
labour ( = 0), the production level is exactly equal to  times the initial one, i.e.
there are constant returns to scale. However, if the production process demand an
overhead quantity of this type of labour ( > 0), we have a production level greater
than the initial one - in fact, greater in (   1) : units of good j -, i.e. there are
increasing returns to scale.
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5.3 Love for variety and increasing returns to specialisation
In Devereux et al. (1996), instead of love for variety, a di¤erent assumption is used to
model the e¤ect of the mass of goods in the macroeconomic equilibrium: increasing
returns to specialisation. There, instead of a basket of nal goods we have a single nal
good (Y ) that is sold in a competitive market at a price P , using solely intermediate
goods in its production. The production function of this nal good has the same












where d (j) =
X
i(j)2=(j)
yi(j) represents the total production of intermediate good j,
produced by m (j) producers. Thus, considering the nal good market equilibrium
(Y = D), demand for good j by the nal good sector has the same expression than
equation (11). Therefore, this type of increasing returns (beside those generated by
 > 0) is formally equivalent to the love for variety case explicitly analysed.
5.4 Wages and multipliers with increasing returns to variety
With free entry ( = 0), and given both the real wage in equation (25) and the
equilibrium mass of rms in (32), we may substitute these values in the equilibrium
equation (30) obtaining
w =
Y    (1  ) :G

.
Now, for a given value of n, we also know the equilibrium value of the non-wage




=   (1  ) ::n

1 






Taking into account that, with free entry ( = 0), we have w = :Y = (:n)




=   (1  ) ::n

1 
(1  :) : (1  ) : [1  : (1  ) :g
] .
In order for the model to have economic meaning, it is necessary that this partial
derivative is negative, i.e. it is necessary that 1  : (1  ) :g > 0. Considering this
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assumption, an increase in the number of rms reduces total prots in the economy,
as it reduces the prots of incumbents.
Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996) advance another argument for this assumption
to hold: if entry is not automatic, but it is a slow (continuous-time) process given by
_n = :, with  > 0, the same assumption is necessary in order to have stability in
the entry process (@ _n=@n = :@=@n < 0).
5.5 Employment as an implicit function of consumption, cap-
ital, and mark-up
The procedure to obtain the equilibrium employment in the economy as an implicit
function L (C;K; ) is similar to the one used to derive the labour-supply function in
the static model. However, we stop short of obtaining a real labour-supply function,
as we only consider the substitution e¤ect.
First, we start with the intratemporal condition equating the marginal rate of
substitution of leisure by consumption to the real wage in equilibrium:
M (C;Z)  uZ (C; 1  L)
uC (C; 1  L)
= (1  ) :FN (K;L) .
Then, we apply the implicit-function theorem and obtain49
LC (C;K; )   
(1  ) :FN :uCC
uZZ
< 0;
LK (C;K; )   
(1  ) :FNK :uC
uZZ
> 0;




5.6 Dynamics of the monopolistic-competition model
Let us start with the no-entry model. Assuming all exogenous variables remain con-
stant, we can approximate the system about its steady-state equilibrium using a
rst-order Taylor expansion given by
49Remember we assumed uCZ = 0. However, the signs of the following partial derivatives would
























C   1 F K + F N :LK

.
Notice that J11jNo entry =
FKN :uZ
uZZ




















. Since we pre-
viously assumed the direct e¤ect on output of an increase in the capital stock (FK)
is larger than its indirect e¤ect through the labour market (FN :LK), than we can
unambiguously see that J12jNo entry < 0.





= (1 + 2)jNo entry =






















Since the discriminant of the characteristic polynomial is always positive, complex
eigenvalues are ruled out, i.e. the steady-state equilibrium is non-oscillatory. Addi-
tionally, we have a negative (i.e. stable) eigenvalue (1) and a positive (i.e. unstable)
eigenvalue (2), implying the steady-state equilibrium is saddle-point stable. Since
we have the transversality condition that rules out explosive solutions, this no-entry
equilibrium is globally stable.




C:: (1  ) :F KN :LC C:: (1  ) : (F KK + F KN :LK)
(1  ) :F N :LC   1 (1  ) : (F K + F N :LK)

.
The signs of the elements in the matrix are not changed and the three measures



























Again, the usual dynamic features of an endogenous-labour Ramsey model are
kept by this free-entry version: a unique globally stable non-oscillatory interior equi-
librium.






















5.7 Geometrical analysis of local dynamics in the (K,C) space
The slopes of the isoclines are very simply related to the elements of the Jacobian,















In order to compare the free-entry to the no-entry situation, let us consider a
common initial equilibrium, i.e. one where n = n. It is easy to see that entry does
not a¤ect the slope of the consumption isocline as both J11 and J12 in the free-entry
version are given by the values in the no-entry version simply multiplied by 1 . The
same happens to J22, but not to J21, where J21jFree entry = (1  ) : J21jNo entry   .

















C   1) : [(1  ) : (F N :LC   1)  ]
> 0,
i.e. the capital-accummulation isocline is steeper when entry is barred than under
free entry.









We can easily see the stable arm is steeper that the _K = 0 isocline, as 1 < 0.
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5.8 8. The long-run multipliers
We can use the expressions obtained in the dynamic analysis to obtain the long-run









Now, the long-run (net) output multiplier is given by 1+ dC

dG and apparently cannot be
signed unambiguously. However, we can use both the production and the employment










Thus, the (net) output multiplier is unambiguously positive, i.e.
dC
dG
 < 1.
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